Abstract. In this paper, we consider the RSA variant based on the key equation ed ≡ 1 (mod φ(N)) where N = p r q, r ≥ 2. We show that if the secret exponent d is close to any multiple of the prime factor p or its powers, then it is possible to factor N in polynomial time in log N.
Introduction
Factoring large integers is a well established problem in number theory and cryptography. The security of many cryptosystems such as RSA [15] is based on its presumed difficulty. Fermat method is efficient to factor a product of two numbers that are close one to another (see e.g. [4] ). In 1931, the continued fraction method was invented [5] . Pollard [11] described the p − 1 method in 1974. Some years later, he discovered the ρ algorithm [12] . The first is known to be practical when the prime factors of p − 1 are small for some prime divisor of N. The second applies a cycle detection technique. In [7] , Lenstra employed the elliptic curves properties to get prime factors of large numbers.
The Quadratic Sieve was published in 1980s by Pomerance [13] . Nowadays, the most efficient factoring algorithm is the Number Field Sieve (NFS) [6, p. 103] that was elaborated by Pollard in 1988 . Since then, the NFS has been further ameliorated.
In order to speed up the decryption/encryption time, it was suggested to use RSA with moduli N = p r q (see e.g. [2] ). Numerous previous papers studied the security of such protocols. Boneh, Durfee, and Howgrave-Graham [1] established that only 1 1 + r fraction of the bits of p suffice to recover the entire p. May [9] generalizes many cryptanalysis methods to schemes with N = p r q. Some of the work in [9] was improved in [16] for r ≤ 5. It was proved in [8] that leaking the bits of some blocks of the prime factors of a modulus N = p r q enables its factorization under certain circumstances. All the previous researches pointed out that integers N = p r q are more vulnerable than a standard RSA modulus, in particular, when r becomes large. In this paper, the RSA variant based on the key equation ed ≡ 1 (mod φ(N)) where N = p r q is considered. We show that using a secret exponent d which is close to any multiple of p or its powers can lead to the factorization of the public modulus.
The article is organized as follows. In section 2, we state our main result after recalling the Coppersmith's theorem for finding small roots of univariate modular polynomials. In section 3, we generalize the method to other RSAtype systems. Finally, we conclude in section 4.
Throughout the sequel, for integers a, b and c, we write a ≡ b (mod c) if c divides the difference a − b, and a = b mod c if a is the remainder in the division of b by c. We denote by gcd(a, b) the greatest common divisor of a and b. All the logarithms should be interpreted as logarithms to the base 2.
Our contribution
In this section, we describe our main result. However, we start by presenting the Coppersmith [3] result for computing small roots of modular polynomials. In particular, we use the slight generalized version as was depicted by May in [9, 10] . One can find in [10] a thorough treatment about the method and its implementation. This technique will be needed in establishing our Theorem 2. 
Now, we state the main contribution:
Theorem 2 Let N = p r q where r ≥ 2 is a given integer constant and p, q are primes of the same bit-size. We denote by (e, d) the public-key/secret-key pair satisfying ed ≡ 1 (mod φ(N)). Assume that there exist two integers i ≥ 1 and
. Parameters i and j are not necessary known. Then, we can factor N in polynomial time in log N.
We assume that the inverse of e modulo N is well defined. Otherwise, we have already a non trivial divisor of N. When
. So, we can determine Δ by using Theorem 1 with b = p l , β = l r + 1 , δ = 1 and c = 1. Since Δ ≡ e −1 (mod q), it is readily seen that gcd(|eΔ − 1|, N) splits N as eΔ − 1 and N are both multiples of p l . If p < q, then q < 2p as p and q are of the same bit-
. This comes from observing that N (
δ . Hence, we obtain Δ by applying Theorem 1 with b = p l , β = l r + 1 − 1 log N , δ = 1 and c = 4. We then get the factorization of N by computing gcd(|eΔ − 1|, N). The running time of our method is dominated by that of Theorem 1 which is polynomial in log N. So, the result is proved.
Theorem 2 leads to the following algorithm:
Input: A public multi power RSA key (N, e) where N = p r q for a given constant r ≥ 2.
Output: The prime decomposition of N or "Failure".
1.
Set the modular polynomial f(x) = x − (e −1 mod N). 2. Apply Coppersmith method as presented in Theorem 1 to compute all the integer roots of f(x) modulo p l where l ≤ r − 1 is a fixed integer. It is not required to know the value of p. 3. Denote by x i , i = 1, 2, . . . , length, the solutions founded in step 2. 4. flag ← 0, i ← 0. 5. While flag = 0 and i ≤ length do:5.1. i ← i + 1. 5.2. Δ ← x i . 5.3. f ← gcd(|eΔ − 1|, N). 5.4. If 1 < f < N then: 5.4.1. flag ← 1.
5.4.2.
If f is not a prime power, then q ← f, p ← N q 1 r .
5.4.3.
Else, determine the prime p that divides f, q ← N p r .
Output (p, q).
6. If i > length, then output "Failure".
For a multi power RSA modulus N = p r q, it is generally recommended to choose a small value of r. Indeed, the more r is large, the less the cryptosystem is secure, see e.g. [1, 9, 8, 16] . Setting r = 2, we obtain the next corollary: in Theorem 2 is optimal for i ≥ r − 1. Under this situation, it is roughly equal to N when r becomes larger.
In the next section, we investigate the threat of our method to other RSA variants.
Extension of our result
The straightforward multi power RSA is obtained by taking N = p r q in the standard RSA key equation ed ≡ 1 (mod φ(N) ). The Takagi crypotsystem [17] is based on ed p ≡ 1 (mod p − 1) and ed q ≡ 1 (mod q − 1). For this protocol, we have:
Proposition 4 Let N = p r q where r ≥ 2 is a given integer constant and p, q are primes of the same bit-size. We denote by (e, d p ) the public-key/secret-key pair satisfying
Proof. By definition,
For the true guess for k p , Δ is a root of the polynomial f(x) modulo p. Moreover, Δ ≡ (1 − k p )e −1 (mod q). Thus, gcd(|eΔ + k p − 1|, N) is a prime power that divides N, since both eΔ + k p − 1 and N are multiples of p. The most time consuming part is Coppersmith method which has a running time O(log 9 N). All the steps must be repeated for each trial k p . Therefore, the whole complexity is eO(log 9 N). Now, suppose that p < q. The primes p and q are of the same bit-size, so q < 2p. It follows that N 1 1+r
Like in the previous case, gcd(|eΔ + k p − 1|, N) is a prime power divisor of N which achieves the proof.
For an RSA-type modulus N = p r q, the primes p and q are not symmetric. We can establish:
Proposition 5 Let N = p r q where r ≥ 2 is a given integer constant and p, q are primes of the same bit-size. We denote by (e, d q ) the public-key/secret-key pair satisfying ed q = 1 + k q (q − 1), i.e. ed q ≡ 1 (mod q − 1). Assume that mod p u ) for all u ≤ r. Then, we can factor N in time eO(log 9 N).
Proof. The RSA key equation satisfies ed q = 1 + k q (q − 1) for some integer k q . The following process will be repeated for each candidate for k q . If d q = q + Δ where Δ ∈ Z, then eΔ + k q − 1 ≡ 0 (mod q). We define the function f(x) = x + (k q − 1)(e −1 mod N). Let p < q. Thus, N As both eΔ + k q − 1 and N are divided by q, the condition (d q − q) ≡ (1 − k q )e −1 (mod p u ) for all u ≤ r guarantees that gcd(|eΔ + k q − 1|, N) = q. All the steps are executed at most e times given that k q < e. Hence, the running time of the method is eO(log 9 N) which demonstrates the result.
Suppose that a private exponent d p or d q satisfies the hypothesis of Proposition 4 or 5 respectively. It is clear that if there exists an oracle that outputs the values of k p or k q such that ed p = 1 + k p (p − 1) or ed q = 1 + k q (q − 1), then N can be factored in polynomial time in log N.
In the following proposition, we apply the technique for RSA systems that use Chinese remainder theorem in decrypting, CRT-RSA (see e.g. [14] for an explicit description). We obtain: Proposition 6 Let N = pq an RSA modulus where p and q are primes of the same bit-size. We denote by (e, d p ) the public-key/secret-key pair satisfying
. Then, we can factor N in time eO(log 9 N).
Proof. By the RSA key equation,
. The modulus N = pq is balanced. Consider the polynomial f(x) = x + (k p − 1)(e −1 mod N) whose degree is δ = 1. The value of |Δ| is upper bounded by N So, the running time is eO(c log 9 N) where c = 1 if q < p and c = 2 otherwise.
Let d p a private exponent that fulfil the hypothesis of Proposition 6. If the value of k p such that ed p = 1 + k p (p − 1) is leaked, then we can efficiently compute the prime decomposition of N.
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed an attack against the RSA variant based on the key equation ed ≡ 1 (mod φ(N)) where N = p r q, r ≥ 2. We showed that if d is close to any multiple of the prime factor p or its powers, then N can be factored in polynomial time in log N, and thus the cryptosystem is completely broken.
